Lance's Corner

OCR Issues HIPAA Cybersecurity Newsletter

Oct 26, 2024

The United States Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has issued its cybersecurity newsletter on the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the dangers of social engineering scams.

October 2024 OCR Cybersecurity Newsletter

Social Engineering: Searching for Your Weakest Link

Cyber threats targeting individuals often take the form of social engineering, where attackers attempt to convince someone to engage in actions or reveal information that can put themselves and their organizations at risk.  Social engineering is an attempt to trick someone into revealing information (e.g., a password) that can be used to attack systems or networks or taking an action (e.g., clicking a link, opening a document).[[1]  See https://405d.hhs.gov/Documents/405d-infection-series-social-engineering-poster.pdf.1]  Between 2019 and 2023 large breaches (i.e., breaches of unsecured protected health information (PHI) involving 500 or more individuals) reported to the HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) as a result of hacking or IT incidents increased 89%.[[2] See https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf.2]  Cybersecurity is often framed solely as a technology issue where protection can be provided by simply purchasing the newest security tool.  But according to a recent report, 68% of breaches involved attacks on humans, not technology.[[3] Verizon.  2024 Data Breach Investigations Report.  (May 2024, p. 8).  Available at https://www.verizon.com/business/en-au/resources/reports/2024/dbir/2024-dbir-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf.3]

Social engineering attackers attempt to manipulate their targets by using an ever-evolving arsenal of technology and deceit.  Such attacks can take many forms including e-mails, texts, calls, or even videos that appear to be from trusted individuals, companies, or institutions.  Using such manipulative techniques can often bring an attacker quicker and easier success than attempting to breach an organization’s cyber defenses.  In short, social engineering is so prevalent because it works.  The end game for social engineering attackers is varied.  Attackers could be seeking money, to disrupt an organization’s operations, or to gain access to sensitive information.  This newsletter discusses common social engineering threats and how individuals and HIPAA regulated entities can defend against them.

Phishing is one of the most frequent social engineering attacks.  A phishing attack attempts to trick individuals into providing sensitive information electronically.  This is most often accomplished through the use of e-mail where the attacker sends an e-mail purporting to be from a trustworthy source, for example, an organization’s HR department, a large retailer, a delivery service, or a financial institution.  The attacker appears to provide a legitimate reason to click a link in the e-mail.  For instance, a phishing e-mail that claims that you have been added to a new office communication or collaboration group, such as a Microsoft Teams Channel.  When the employee clicks the link, they are taken to a forged website that looks nearly identical to the website they expect to see.  At the forged website, they are asked to enter their username and password to validate their identity.  Once they have provided their credentials the attacker can now use those credentials against the individual’s organization and information systems.

The HIPAA Security Rule requires that HIPAA covered entities[[4] See 45 CFR 160.103 (definition of “Covered entity”).4]  and business associates[[5] See 45 CFR 160.103 (definition of “Business associate”).5]  (regulated entities) identify and protect against reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of electronic (ePHI),[[6] See 45 CFR 164.306(a)(2).6]  but attackers have learned that successful cyber-attacks against an employee may be easier than attacking an organization directly.  For this reason, a phishing e-mail targeting an organization may not only be sent to an employee’s work e-mail but may also be sent to their personal e-mail.  If successful, the phishing attack then compromises the employee’s personal device which may be used to access work e-mails and is often also a method of authentication into their employer’s network.  In another scenario, if an employee accessing their personal e-mail from their work device clicks on a malicious link from a phishing e-mail, malicious software could be installed on the work device and potentially spread across the organization.

Smishing is a form of social engineering that uses Short Message Service (SMS) messaging (i.e., text messages) to trick someone into downloading malicious software or clicking on a link to a malicious website to get the text message recipient to share sensitive information such as their username and password.  Typically, the individual receives a message stating that they need to take some immediate action or face a negative consequence.  For instance, the message may come from a bank asking to confirm a large withdrawal or it could pretend to be from your employer asking you to reset your password to access your work e-mail.  The message will include a link to a website or may even include a phone number to call.  The attacker’s goal is to have the individual click on a link that directs them to a malicious website or to call the number listed where the attackers can attempt to manipulate the individual.  Some tips to avoid a successful smishing or phishing attack include:

  • Be suspicious of links sent via SMS messaging or e-mails that are not expected.  While many may be legitimate, there are many more that are not.  An individual should mistrust messages offering prizes or deals too good to be true.
  • Do not call a number sent through an SMS message or unexpected e-mail, especially when such messages or e-mails attempt to convey a sense of urgency.  Instead, look up the number to the organization supposedly contacting you and call to confirm the information.
  • Never provide sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, or personally identifiable information.  Instead, call the organization requesting such information using a known good phone number (such as the organization’s customer support number from their website) to verify why they need your sensitive information.  Do not rely on a phone number provided in the SMS message or e-mail as those could belong to the attacker.

Baiting is another social engineering attack that is very similar to smishing and phishing in that it uses electronic means to tempt an individual into acting in a way they know they should not.  Baiting involves an enticement or bait to lure an individual in.  Most often this takes the form of something valuable.  This enticement may not come to an individual’s work e-mail but rather through their personal e-mail and often involves winning a prize or being selected for something of value.  To claim the prize, the individual is typically provided a link to click on.  This link then installs malicious software on their computer or phone, or it takes them to a website that installs the malicious software.  This may not seem like a threat to an individual’s organization since it infected their personal device or e-mail, but people may use their personal devices as a second form of authentication when using multi-factor authentication or a person, if permitted, may access their personal e-mail from a work device.  By compromising an individual’s personal device or e-mail, the attackers are now one step closer to bypassing the security controls that the organization uses to protect itself and secure sensitive information such as ePHI.

Another form of baiting involves physically leaving something laying around, such as a storage device in a common area like a lobby or parking lot.  This form of baiting seeks to exploit someone’s curiosity.  For example, leaving a USB drive laying on the ground in an organization’s parking lot is relying on someone’s curiosity to pick it up and plug it into a computer to access the stored information.  However, when the USB is plugged in, malicious software is installed.  Plugging a USB into a workstation at work could infect their organization’s network and compromise sensitive information such as ePHI.  Doing this at home could compromise the individual’s personal computer which could be used to attack other computers or for remote workers, it could remotely compromise the organization they work for.

Avoiding baiting requires being skeptical of offers that appear too good to be true and of unattended devices.  If the offer seems too good or one doesn’t recall entering a contest to begin with, they can always search for it online.  A quick Google search can often identify the offer as a known threat.  Even if a person only falls for the initial message the attackers will then begin trying to manipulate the individual.  If a person fails to recognize the initial lure they should still never provide their credentials or click on links from websites that they have not verified.

Deepfakes[[7] “A deepfake is a video, photo, or audio recording that seems real but has been manipulated with AI.  The underlying technology can replace faces, manipulate facial expressions, synthesize faces, and synthesize speech.  Deepfakes can depict someone appearing to say or do something that they in fact never said or did.”  See General Accounting Office.  Science & Tech Spotlight: Deepfakes.  (Feb. 2024).  Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-379sp.pdf. 7]  Artificial intelligence (AI) technology has advanced to allow for lower cost and lower effort manipulation of video, photos, and audio.  These manipulations can replace faces in a video and even synthesize voices in real time.  A deepfake is when an individual believes they are communicating with a trustworthy source either over the phone or via video.  It can be hard to detect a deepfake and even harder not to trust what we believe we are seeing with our own eyes.  Deepfakes are not limited to manipulated videos.  Deepfake technology can be also used to simulate the voice of a trusted individual such as a supervisor or executive in your organization.  This threat is called AI cloning and it can apply to a person’s voice as well as videos of people.  Combining a simulated voice with a spoofed phone number, an attacker could convincingly imitate a CEO making a help desk request to reset their password or to make changes to the network security settings to provide greater access to sensitive data such as ePHI.  As technology improves it will become harder to detect deepfakes, but for now there are a few signs to look for.  Some key signs one can look for to discover a deepfake include:[[8] See General Accounting Office.  Science & Tech Spotlight: Combating Deepfakes.  (Mar. 2024).  Available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107292. 8]

  • Inconsistent eye blinking.  If a person’s face seems slightly off because they don’t blink, or they blink too often it could be a sign of a deepfake.
  • Facial features lack a clear definition, seem to be melted, or are too smooth.
  • A person’s mouth movements are not quite synced up with the words they are saying.
  • Unnatural skin colorizations.
  • Abnormal boundary between hair and background.

If one suspects they are experiencing a deepfake attack, they should ask questions where the answers are not publicly available and that only the real person should know.  If still unsure, disconnect and call the person back or text them using phone numbers known to be correct to confirm that the person was real.

The HIPAA Security Rule includes many provisions that can aid regulated entities in preventing or mitigating threats posed by social engineering.  The Security Rule requires regulated entities to “[e]nsure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all [ePHI] the [regulated entity] creates, receives, maintains, or transmits”[[9] 45 CFR 164.306(a)(1).9]  and also requires that they “[p]rotect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of [ePHI].”[[10]  45 CFR 164.306(a)(3).10]  All of the social engineering threats discussed in this newsletter are reasonably anticipated threats to a regulated entity’s ePHI and should be considered when regulated entities implement security measures to protect their ePHI.

Informing workforce members about new and emerging social engineering threats can be incorporated into a regulated entity’s HIPAA Security Rule obligation to implement a security awareness and training program.[[11] See 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(i).11]  Sending simulated phishing e-mails to test workforce member knowledge of how to identify phishing e-mails is an excellent method of providing security reminders, another provision of the Security Rule.[[12] See 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A).12]  A well-educated workface is the first line, and often the best line, of defense to halt a cyber-attack before it starts.

However, should a social engineering or other cyber-attack be successful, HIPAA regulated entities are also required to have appropriate safeguards in place that ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their ePHI.  This includes technical safeguards to protect the integrity of ePHI from improper alteration or destruction[[13] See 45 CFR 164.312(c)(1).13]  and allowing access to ePHI to only those granted access rights to such ePHI.[[14] See 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1).14]  Technical solutions that can help mitigate the threat of social engineering threats can include anti-phishing technologies, verifying that received e-mails do not come from known malicious sites, scanning web links or attachments, and using machine learning or behavioral analysis to detect and prevent potential threats.  Granular role-based access, network segmentation, and strict access limits to privileged accounts and administrative tools are ways regulated entities can control and limit access to ePHI.

Regulated entities are required to conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their ePHI.[[15] See 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A).15]  The results of this risk analysis should inform regulated entities’ decisions on their implementation of appropriate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to protect ePHI.  The risk analysis must consider potential risks and vulnerabilities to all of the ePHI a regulated entity holds.[[16] See 45 CFR 164.306(a)(1).16]  Regulated entities should also consider that risks and vulnerabilities to ePHI may change as ePHI is processed and flows within their environment.  A comprehensive technology asset inventory (e.g., hardware and software) and ePHI data flow diagrams are valuable tools that can assist regulated entities as they conduct an accurate and thorough risk analysis.

Conclusion

When it comes to cybersecurity, the concept of “trust no one” applies to both businesses and individuals.  Attackers have learned how to convincingly imitate our loved ones and our business partners, meaning that nothing can be assumed or taken at face value.  Attackers continue to refine their manipulation through social engineering trade craft.  All of these threats have a common theme; they all attempt to convince an individual to do something they would not otherwise do normally, or to provide details such as credentials someplace other than where they should be used.  Educating workforce members on these attacks is essential when it comes to an individual’s ability to identify and potentially halt social engineering attacks before they start.  Such knowledge is powerful not only to protect individuals in their personal online activities, but also by extension an individual’s employer.  This is especially important in the current environment where work is taken home on laptops, smart phones, and through remote work.

Additional Resources:

HHS Social Engineering Attacks Targeting the HPH Sector

HHS 405(d) Knowledge on Demand: Social Engineering

HHS/FBI Joint Social Engineering Advisory

GAO Science & Tech Spotlight: Deepfakes

CISA Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks

HHS OCR Cybersecurity Newsletter: Defending Against Common Cyber-Attacks

Update to HHS OCR’s Change Healthcare Cybersecurity Incident FAQ Webpage

On October 22, 2024, Change Healthcare notified the HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) that approximately 100 million individual notices have been sent regarding this breach.  OCR has updated the answer to question #11 on OCR’s “Change Healthcare Cybersecurity Incident Frequently Asked Questions” webpage on this issue.  OCR will continue to update the FAQs as needed.

USDOL Issues Comprehensive Employer Guidance on Long COVID

The United States Department of Labor (USDOL) has issued a comprehensive set of resources that can be accessed below for employers on dealing with Long COVID.

Supporting Employees with Long COVID: A Guide for Employers

The “Supporting Employees with Long COVID” guide from the USDOL-funded Employer Assistance and Resource Network on Disability Inclusion (EARN) and Job Accommodation Network (JAN) addresses the basics of Long COVID, including its intersection with mental health, and common workplace supports for different symptoms.  It also explores employers’ responsibilities to provide reasonable accommodations and answers frequently asked questions about Long COVID and employment, including inquiries related to telework and leave.

Download the guide

Accommodation and Compliance: Long COVID

The Long COVID Accommodation and Compliance webpage from the USDOL-funded Job Accommodation Network (JAN) helps employers and employees understand strategies for supporting workers with Long COVID.  Topics include Long COVID in the context of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), specific accommodation ideas based on limitations or work-related functions, common situations and solutions, and questions to consider when identifying effective accommodations for employees with Long COVID.  Find this and other Long COVID resources from JAN, below:

Long COVID, Disability and Underserved Communities: Recommendations for Employers

The research-to-practice brief “Long COVID, Disability and Underserved Communities” synthesizes an extensive review of documents, literature and data sources, conducted by the USDOL-funded Employer Assistance and Resource Network on Disability Inclusion (EARN) on the impact of Long COVID on employment, with a focus on demographic differences.  It also outlines recommended actions organizations can take to create a supportive and inclusive workplace culture for people with Long COVID, especially those with disabilities who belong to other historically underserved groups.

Read the brief

Long COVID and Disability Accommodations in the Workplace

The policy brief “Long COVID and Disability Accommodations in the Workplace” explores Long COVID’s impact on the workforce and provides examples of policy actions different states are taking to help affected people remain at work or return when ready.  It was developed by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) as part of its involvement in USDOL’s State Exchange on Employment and Disability (SEED) initiative.

Download the policy brief

Understanding and Addressing the Workplace Challenges Related to Long COVID

The report “Understanding and Addressing the Workplace Challenges Related to Long COVID” summarizes key themes and takeaways from an ePolicyWorks national online dialogue through which members of the public were invited to share their experiences and insights regarding workplace challenges posed by Long COVID.  The dialogue took place during summer 2022 and was hosted by USDOL and its agencies in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Surgeon General.

Download the report

Working with Long COVID

The USDOL-published “Working with Long COVID” fact sheet shares strategies for supporting workers with Long COVID, including accommodations for common symptoms and resources for further guidance and assistance with specific situations.

Download the fact sheet

COVID-19: Long-Term Symptoms

This USDOL motion graphic informs workers with Long COVID that they may be entitled to temporary or long-term supports to help them stay on the job or return to work when ready, and shares where they can find related assistance.

Watch the motion graphic

A Personal Story of Long COVID and Disability Disclosure

In the podcast “A Personal Story of Long COVID and Disability Disclosure,” Pam Bingham, senior program manager for Intuit’s Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in Tech team, shares her personal experience of navigating Long COVID symptoms at work.  The segment was produced by the USDOL-funded Partnership on Employment and Accessible Technology (PEAT) as part of its ongoing “Future of Work” podcast series.

Listen to the podcast

HHS OIG Issues Annual Report on State MFCUs

Per the notice below, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has issued its annual report on the performance of state Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCUs).

Medicaid Fraud Control Units Fiscal Year 2023 Annual Report (OEI-09-24-00200) 

Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCUs) investigate and prosecute Medicaid provider fraud and patient abuse or neglect. OIG is the Federal agency that oversees and annually approves federal funding for MFCUs through a recertification process. This new report analyzed the statistical data on annual case outcomes—such as convictions, civil settlements and judgments, and recoveries—that the 53 MFCUs submitted for Fiscal Year 2023.  New York data is as follows:

Outcomes

  • Investigations1 - 556
  • Indicted/Charged - 9
  • Convictions - 8
  • Civil Settlements/Judgments - 28
  • Recoveries2 - $73,204,518

Resources

  • MFCU Expenditures3 - $55,964,293
  • Staff on Board4 - 257

1Investigations are defined as the total number of open investigations at the end of the fiscal year.

2Recoveries are defined as the amount of money that defendants are required to pay as a result of a settlement, judgment, or prefiling settlement in criminal and civil cases and may not reflect actual collections.  Recoveries may involve cases that include participation by other Federal and State agencies.

3MFCU and Medicaid Expenditures include both State and Federal expenditures.

4Staff on Board is defined as the total number of staff employed by the Unit at the end of the fiscal year.

Read the Full Report

View the Statistical Chart

Engage with the Interactive Map

GAO Issues Report on Medicaid Managed Care Service Denials and Appeal Outcomes

The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a report on federal use of state data on Medicaid managed care service denials and appeal outcomes.  GAO found that federal oversight is limited because it doesn't require states to report on Medicaid managed care service denials or appeal outcomes and there has not been much progress on plans to analyze and make the data publicly available.  To read the GAO report on federal use of state data on Medicaid managed care service denials and appeal outcomes, use the first link below.  To read GAO highlights of the report on federal use of state data on Medicaid managed care service denials and appeal outcomes, use the second link below.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24106627.pdf  (GAO report on federal use of state data on Medicaid managed care service denials and appeal outcomes)
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24106627_high.pdf  (GAO highlights on federal use of state data on Medicaid managed care service denials and appeal outcomes)

CMS Issues Latest Medicare Regulatory Activities Update

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has issued its latest update on its regulatory activities in the Medicare program.  While dentistry is only minimally connected to the Medicare program, Medicare drives the majority of health care policies and insurance reimbursement policies throughout the country.  Therefore, it always pays to keep a close eye on what CMS is doing in Medicare.  To read the latest CMS update on its regulatory activities in Medicare, use the link below.
https://www.cms.gov/training-education/medicare-learning-network/newsletter/2024-03-14-mlnc